Morality primarily serves socio-relational functions. However, little research in moral psychology investigates how relational factors impact moral judgment, and a theoretically grounded approach to investigating relational context effects on moral judgment is lacking.
will be particularly concerning. Yet under (b), the judge's attention and concerns may be oriented to the Hierarchy motive. The same acts of inequality are consistent with the studentteacher relationship; instead, the judge's attention will be directed toward actions such as disobedience or abuse of power. Hence, the very same moral action should be judged differently, depending on the moral motive implicated in the relational context. Beyond substantial empirical validation of RRT's precursor, Relational Models Theory (see Haslam, 2004) , RRT itself has received some preliminary empirical support (Simpson & Laham, 2015a , 2015b .
Moral Foundations Theory
In exploring relational context effects on moral judgment, we required a wide range of moral concerns and violations. Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2007) provides a comprehensive account of moral values. It expands on Western notions of morality (which traditionally focused on concerns of care, harm, and justice/fairness), proposing five discrete sets of moral values/intuitions. Care and Fairness are theorized as individualizing foundations, as they protect the rights and safety of individuals (rather than groups). Care emphasizes compassion, empathy, and non-harm, while Fairness stresses equality, justice, and reciprocity. The other three foundations are theorized as binding foundations, as they "bind" people together by prioritizing concern for the collective over the individual. Loyalty involves a moral duty to support the ingroup and to show loyalty to close others. Respect prescribes a moral duty to revere and submit to higher status persons. Finally, Purity entails a moral duty to avoid physical/spiritual contaminants (e.g., religious taboos) that may threaten the purity and cohesion of the ingroup.
MFT has received empirical support in numerous studies (in particular, Graham et al., 2011) .
MFT has made invaluable contributions to the moral psychology literature by expanding our knowledge of the various contents of individuals' moral judgments and by Relational Context Effects on Moral Judgment 6 highlighting important individual differences in moral values. However, no research has systematically explored how varying relational context affects judgments of violations pertaining to each moral foundation (but see Simpson & Laham, 2015a ; discussed later). We sought to address this research gap in the present studies.
The Present Research
Some past research shows certain evidence for relational context effects on moral judgment. For example, Haidt and Baron (1996) varied relationships along dimensions of either hierarchy or equality to investigate judgments of violations (most of which pertained to the Care and Fairness foundations); Kurzban, DeScioli, and Fein (2012) investigated judgments of harm-based moral dilemmas when actors and victims were either friends, brothers, or strangers; also, Selterman and Koleva (in 2014) explored judgments of disloyal acts in various close relationships. However, these studies did not investigate relational context effects using judgments of moral foundations violations, thus limiting their coverage of the moral domain. Also, relational contexts were not designed using the tenets of RRT.
For example, Selterman and Koleva found that relational context was a weak or nonsignificant predictor of wrongness compared to other factors (e.g., gender). But the relational contexts they contrasted were 'romantic partner' and 'best friend' (both align with the Unity MM), and 'stranger' (essentially a null relationship with weak and ambiguous moral motivation). Hence, the limited role of relational context in their results might be because they only seemed to address one MM.
In contrast, one study that did investigate moral motives alongside moral foundations (Simpson & Laham, 2015a) showed that individual differences in relational construal captured variability in moral judgment. Participants rated the degree to which each MM Second, to ensure that any theoretical implications were not artefacts of stimulus selection, Study 3 used the same MM prototypes as in Studies 1-2 but included a different set of moral foundations violations.
Hypotheses. Our central hypothesis was that varying the relational context in which moral violations take place should predict variability in wrongness judgments independently of other factors relevant to moral judgment. Past research (e.g., Graham et al., 2011; Hierarchy, Equality, and Proportionality, respectively) . This distinction, however, is unimportant; we refer to moral motives (MMs) throughout to avoid unnecessary excesses in terminology. Selterman & Koleva, 2014) has found particularly strong effects on moral judgment as functions of gender as well as factors pertaining to moral values, political ideology, and religiosity. Hence, we sought to statistically control for effects of: gender; endorsement of the moral foundations; political belief; and frequency of attendance at religious ceremonies (a common measure of religiosity and one that is particularly relevant to moral judgment; e.g., Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan, 2009; Graham et al., 2011) .
Beyond this primary goal, we also tested some specific hypotheses derived from RRT (Rai & Fiske, 2011, p.66) .
STUDY 1
In Study 1, we tested hypotheses using a within-participants design. Participants judged the wrongness of violations occurring in four different relationships, each indexing a particular moral motive. Covariates. We included several factors commonly shown to be associated with both moral judgment and moral foundations endorsements (e.g., Graham et al., 2011; Koleva et al., 2012; Selterman & Koleva, in 2014 
Procedure
Participants rated the moral wrongness of each violation in each relational context on a 5-point scale (1=not at all wrong, 5=very wrong). They judged each violation in each relational context before moving to the next violation. Relational contexts were presented in random order for each violation, and violation order was randomized for each participant.
Participants then completed items addressing the covariates, in the order outlined above.
Results and Discussion
We hypothesized, above all, that relational context would predict moral wrongness over and above known predictors of moral judgment (e.g., gender). Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 religious attendance. We also ran a mixed-design ANOVA to control for (d) gender. Table 2 displays pertinent results. The assumption of sphericity was violated for all analyses, so the (relatively conservative) Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used. 2 When no covariate was included in the models ( The specific predictions derived from RRT and MFT were mostly supported, albeit with one notable exception. Purity violations were deemed most wrong in the StudentProfessor (Hierarchy) context, inconsistent with theorizing in both RRT and MFT that Purity should serve as an ingroup-binding moral concern, and should thus be more important under the Unity MM (i.e., in the Siblings context). This was explored further in subsequent studies.
STUDY 2
Although Study 1 yielded findings largely consistent with hypotheses, effects may have been driven partly by experimenter demand and/or the joint-evaluation design. Maybe relational context differences in judgment of moral foundations violations emerge only when people engage in explicit, comparative judgments between relational contexts. To address this concern, Study 2 replicated Study 1 in a design in which relational context was a between-participants factor.
In addition, Study 2 included a control (no relational context) condition-in which the relationship between actors and victims was left unspecified-and an 'inverse-Hierarchy' condition in which a superior acts toward a subordinate. 
Method

Materials and Procedure
Violations were retained from Study 1 with the same response scale (1=not at all wrong, 5=very wrong), and the same relational contexts from Study 1 were used only now with the added 'inverse-Hierarchy' context and the relational context-free control.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions. They read instructions asking them to imagine each violation happening in a particular relational context (e.g., "Imagine you saw somebody doing these acts to his or her sibling [just think of sibling relationships in general]. Please rate how wrong you think each act is."). Participants then responded to the violations (presentation order was randomized for each participant), and then completed measures addressing moral foundations endorsements, gender, religious attendance, and political ideology, as in Study 1.
Results and Discussion
For all moral foundations, wrongness judgments in the two Hierarchy conditions were equivalent (independent samples t-tests, ts<1. 47, ps>.146 Hence, these Relational Context effects were robust to the inclusion of variables pertaining to ideology, religious attendance, and gender, and were moderately robust to inclusion of moral foundation endorsement.
[Insert foundation; e.g., the Ingroup item "I am proud of my country's history"), using a 1(strongly disagree) to 6(strongly agree) scale. Item reliabilities for each foundation across the Relevance and Judgment subscales were acceptable (all αs>.68). We also sought to control for a more specific measure of political ideology, which arguably better addresses ideological differences in moral judgment. We asked participants "What is your political belief regarding social issues?" using the same 1-11 scale in Studies 1-2.
Procedure
Participants judged the violations (presentation order randomized for each participant) using a 5-point scale (1=not wrong at all, 5=very wrong). In a within-participants design, participants judged these violations in five different relational contexts: Siblings, StudentProfessor, Professor-Student, Housemates, and Customer-Salesperson. Presentation order of these relational contexts was randomized for each item, separately for each participant. They then completed measures addressing the covariates, in the same order as in Studies 1-2. We assessed the unique role of Relational Context in predicting variability in judgment of each moral foundation composite using a series of within-participants ANCOVAs. Relational context typically explained variability in moral judgment independent of other correlates of moral judgment, supporting our central hypothesis. Also, this occurred in two different sets of moral foundations violations and two experimental designs (jointevaluation, within-participants; and separate-evaluation, between-participants), suggesting that results were not due to issues of stimulus selection or researcher demand. This is an important finding, given that the covariates we included in these studies-gender, ideology, religious attendance, and moral values-usually account for a substantial amount of variability in moral judgment. First, there is strong evidence for gender differences in moral judgment (e.g., Graham et al., 2011; Selterman & Koleva, 2014 ); yet in the present studies, relational context effects were often strongest when accounting for gender differences in wrongness judgments. Second, countless studies depict large variability in moral judgment as a function of political ideology; importantly, this includes judgments of violations pertaining to the moral foundations (e.g., Clifford, Iyengar, Cabeza, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015; Graham et al., 2009 ). Third, religious attendance is associated with variability in endorsement of the moral foundations (e.g., Graham et al., 2011) , while Ginges et al. (2009) found that religious attendance strongly predicted moral judgment of suicide attacks among samples of Palestinians and Israelis. Clearly, therefore, religious attendance is a key factor in understanding variability in moral judgment; nevertheless, it failed to account for the present effects of relational context. Finally, in most analyses relational context effects were robust to inclusion of moral foundation endorsement. This is despite the obvious conceptual correspondence between endorsement of a moral foundation and judgment of acts that violate that foundation.
Results
Comparing wrongness judgments in the two
Overall, this evidence strongly points to the conclusion that if we want to gain a thorough understanding of why individuals vary in their moral judgments, relational context cannot be ignored.
Relationship Regulation Theory
The typically independent predictive role of relational context is in contrast to findings of Selterman and Koleva (2014) , who found very few independent effects of relational context in a similar experimental design. This suggests that varying relational contexts according to the four moral motives (compared to other considerations, e.g., varying the closeness of relationships; Kurzban et al., 2012; Selterman & Koleva) is more conducive to capturing relational context-based variability in moral judgment. Hence, (and returning to Bloom's [2011] contentions that we discussed in the Introduction), while RRT might not be the only theory of relational context-based variability in moral judgment, evidence suggests that it may come closest to being a "right" theory. For now, at least, varying relational contexts according to the moral motives of Unity, Hierarchy, Equality, and Proportionality might best allow researchers to design the so-called "right" studies geared toward better understanding why relationships matter so much in moral psychology.
Results also extend Simpson and Laham's (2015a) finding that variability in MM construal of numerous MM-neutral relationships is associated with variability in moral judgment. The current studies showed very similar MM-moral foundation patterns (see Figures 1-3 ), but used prototypes designed to experimentally activate each MM (rather than measure them in a correlational design). That these two contrasting methodologies converge with similar patterns of MM-moral judgment associations provides added support for RRT's contentions. Relational factors, it seems, are not merely amoral concerns biasing people away from supposedly "true", universal moral judgments (a contention often voiced in traditional psychological theories of moral judgment; e.g., Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932; Turiel, 1983) . Rather, how wrong an action is depends largely on its socio-relational context and the corresponding MM for relationship regulation.
This empirical, "positive" result contrasts dramatically with the prescriptive characterization of morality widely endorsed in philosophy, which typically considers it a defining feature of morality that its principles be universal, applying to all persons (e.g., Kant, 1785 Kant, /1989 Rawls, 2005) . That does not seem to be how American participants make moral judgments; they judge what is right or wrong largely according to the type of relationship in which an act occurs. that when not encouraged to contrast different relationships, individuals judge these violations equivalently across relational contexts.) This points to meaningful differences between emotionally and physically harmful acts, a distinction that is not particularly highlighted in either MFT or RRT. As predicted, Fairness violations were consistently deemed least wrong in Sibling (Unity) contexts, congruent with Rai and Fiske's (2011) contention that "people within [communal] relationships can take freely from each other, as notions of individual ownership are minimized" (p.62).
Moral Motives and Moral
The Purity foundation provided results least consistent with hypotheses. RRT postulates that purity concerns should be particularly prominent under the Unity motive when one is on guard for acts threatening ingroup dignity and integrity. For similar reasons, MFT describes Purity as an "ingroup-binding" foundation. Nevertheless, Purity violations were consistently judged most wrong in the Student-Professor (Hierarchy) and/or CustomerSalesperson (Proportionality) contexts. Similarly, Simpson and Laham (2015a) found that construal of interpersonal relationships in terms of the Hierarchy motive, but not the Unity motive, was associated with perceived wrongness of Purity violations. Thus, it seems that "impure acts" (e.g., promoting sex-fetish websites, or urinating on someone's grave) are deemed more acceptable in relationships regulated by Unity in which one may be more tolerant of a close other's idiosyncrasies, and more wrong in relationships regulated by Hierarchy or Proportionality in which indecent/impure acts may offend authorities or undermine social order. One possible reason for these results is that the Purity foundation's operationalization in empirical work does not adequately capture the sense in which it is often discussed in theoretical work. That is, there appears a gap between (a) the metaphorical/theoretical use of Purity as a value system aimed at preserving the integrity of groups, and (b) how the foundation is operationalized. Hence, future work should consider an operationalization which more adequately captures the "binding" sense with which Purity is increasingly discussed in moral psychology.
Limitations and Future Directions
In selecting prototypical relationships for each MM we sought clear representation, rather than exhaustive sampling, of each MM. While this aided generalizability across different moral stimuli and different experimental designs, generalizability across MM exemplars warrants further investigation. 3 For example, there are obvious differences in how the Hierarchy motive is implemented in student-professor relationships compared to other
Hierarchy-based relationships (e.g., citizen-police relations). Moreover, the one dyadic relationship typically involves numerous domains of relationship coordination: e.g., when
seeking to understand a perplexing phenomenon, professor and student may work together through a "let's put our heads together" framework, which would situationally implicate the Unity motive, rather than the Hierarchy motive, for morally-relevant concerns. Hence, future research should investigate whether violations are judged differently depending on the MMs governing not just relational context but also interactional context-the specific domain and situation.
Interestingly, Study 2's between-participants design provided only weak support for the specific MM-judgment hypotheses. Also, judgments of Fairness violations were inconsistent with those in Studies 1 and 3: Figure 2 suggests that these violations were most wrong in the Housemates (Equality) context, and indeed, this was confirmed by the pertinent F(1,249)=5.08, p=.025, η 2 p=.020 . It is possible that relational context was less salient in Study 2: participants were only prompted with the relational context at the beginning of the moral judgment task (whereas in Studies 1 and 3 relational contexts needed to be highlighted for each violation given the within-participants design). Alternatively, this might suggests that relational context impacts moral judgment in somewhat different ways when relational contexts are presented in isolation than when they are presented simultaneously (which would be consistent with findings that joint-and separate-evaluation designs often yield contrasting effects; Hsee et al., 1999) . This latter possibility may be an interesting topic for future research.
The studies we report here show that moral judgments are often relative to the dyadic relationship in which an act occurs. But there is far more to social relationships than dyads (or groups). RRT and Meta-Relational Models Theory (Fiske, 2011) theorize and provide ethnological evidence that many of the most impelling moral motives are based on models of how social relationships may, must, or must not be combined. These are meta-relational models. For example, while most secular Westerners condone consensual sex, few condone sexual relations between a man and his wife's adopted daughter (consider Woody Allen and Soon-Yi Previn). In many cultures one is morally obliged to kill enemies in war. But suppose the enemy you face is your sister's husband-many people would have moral qualms about killing him. To understand the nature of moral motives and actions, we must appreciated that social relationships are rarely isolated from each other; what is right or wrong depends not only on the MM coordinating the dyad, but how that dyad is embedded in a larger configuration of relationships.
Conclusion
In this paper we have established a viable approach to investigate relational context effects on moral judgment. Relationship Regulation Theory (a direct derivative of Relational Models Theory, a thoroughly supported theory regarding the fundamentals of socio-relational cognition) and Moral Foundations Theory (a comprehensive theory regarding the content of the moral domain) provide criteria for varying relational contexts and moral violations that are both theoretically sound and empirically useful.
Observing the present findings, one of the most interesting implications comes from considering judgments in the control condition relative to the relational context conditions in Study 2. The control is analogous to the relational context-free manner in which most moral psychology experiments are conducted (Bloom, 2011) and most prescriptive moral philosophy is analysed. In some instances, judgments in context-free conditions differ substantially from those in relational context conditions. Except in certain kinds of discourse, such global, decontextualized judgments are uncommon. Most moral judgments are judgments about specific acts or patterns of action of specific persons in specific relationships (Bloom, 2011) that they generate using a specific moral motive in a specific way. What people judge is not the action itself, defined in terms of its morphology or consequences, but how the action constitutes relationships. How wrong an act is, or whether it is wrong at all, depends on the relationship between the actor and the persons affected. Abstract, global endorsement of "values" may have little to do with everyday moral judgments occurring in particular relationships. The results herein suggest that variability in relational context can sometimes account for over 50% of variation in moral judgments. Hence, it seems unlikely that a comprehensive understanding of the psychology of morality can be achieved without taking relationships seriously. 
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